Justice in the Philippines: A Checkered Past with Implications for the Future by Roush, Spencer
Pepperdine Policy Review
Volume 11 Article 7
5-10-2019
Justice in the Philippines: A Checkered Past with
Implications for the Future
Spencer Roush
Pepperdine University, School of Public Policy, spencer.roush@pepperdine.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/ppr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Public Policy at Pepperdine Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Pepperdine Policy Review by an authorized editor of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
josias.bartram@pepperdine.edu , anna.speth@pepperdine.edu.
Recommended Citation
Roush, Spencer (2019) "Justice in the Philippines: A Checkered Past with Implications for the Future," Pepperdine Policy Review: Vol.
11 , Article 7.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/ppr/vol11/iss1/7
Justice in the Philippines: A Checkered Past with Implications for the Future 
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Abstract 
Human rights issues remain commonplace throughout the world, but the transition from authoritarian to 
democratic regimes often exposes these abuses. Once a new democracy is established, the entire country 
is forced to reckon with abuses from the past. The different routes that countries take in these instances 
represent the growing field of transitional justice. Transitional justice means different things to different 
people, but many would agree that one of its goals is that countries should make attempts to deter 
similar historical abuses from reoccurring in the future. This paper uses the Philippines as a case study to 
look at the way transitional justice was manifest after the fall of Ferdinand Marcos in 1986. It will examine 
the method used and its level of success.      
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Introduction 
 Ferdinand Marcos was democratically elected as the president of the Philippines in 1969. 
Following his ascent to power, Marcos successfully consolidated power, and by 1972, declared martial 
law under the pretext of an imminent threat from a communist insurgency (Davidson, 11). The 
implementation of martial law solidified Ferdinand Marcos as an authoritarian dictator of the 
Philippines, giving him absolute authority over every institution within the government (Davidson, 10). 
With unlimited authority, Marcos could now direct the military to detain anyone he considered to be a 
political opponent or threat to his regime (Davidson, 10). This resulted in extensive human rights 
violations, including forced disappearances, cases of torture and extrajudicial killings (Chua, 4). The 
transitional justice mechanism that the international community chose to pursue against Marcos was an 
Alien Tort Act lawsuit (ATA). The ATA is a United States Civil Law that allows Federal Courts to maintain 
jurisdiction over civil disputes between two parties who are non-citizens but are physically present in 
the United States (ATA, LexisNexis).  
 The transition from the authoritarian dictatorship in the Philippines under Ferdinand Marcos to 
democracy is the focus of this research. I argue that there were two conditions that led society to 
choose an ATA lawsuit in order to pursue justice against Marcos after he was ousted from power in 
February of 1986. The first condition came directly following Marcos’ removal from power in 1986 in 
which he fled to Hawaii and, immediately upon arrival, was granted amnesty by the Reagan 
administration. This prevented any potential future extradition for a criminal prosecution in the 
Philippines from taking place (Davidson, 11). By taking one of the more obvious choices off the table, the 
options available to the Philippine people to pursue justice against Marcos were severely limited. The 
second condition, by a stroke of luck, came about thanks to an American attorney named Robert Swift. 
He had previously worked on an unsuccessful ATA litigation. Swift read about Marcos’ arrival in Hawaii 
in the New York Times, and he saw an opportunity to bring an ATA lawsuit against Marcos (Davidson, 
12). He then took it upon himself to travel to the Philippines, where he was able to connect with a Non-
Governmental Organization called SELDA. This organization was comprised of Marcos’ former political 
opponents who were attempting to seek justice against him domestically, but had hit a roadblock with 
Marcos’ asylum in Hawaii (Davidson, 12).  
 Swift successfully pitched the idea of an ATA lawsuit to SELDA. Collectively, SELDA and Swift 
were able to come up with two clear goals that they wanted to achieve by suing Marcos: 1) make sure 
that the human rights violations that Marcos committed were documented in court records through 
witness testimony, ensuring public acknowledgment of what Marcos had done and, 2) gain as much 
financial compensation for victims of Marcos’ crimes, given that many lost their potential to earn 
income as a direct result of bodily injury that was caused by the human rights violations committed 
against them (Ela, 12).  
With respect to the first goal, I argue that the case was largely a success. Many victims had the 
opportunity to testify and publicize Marcos’s human rights abuses in court. With respect to the second 
goal, I contend that the ATA lawsuit was largely a failure because it took nearly two decades for the 
victims to receive any compensation from the lawsuits and the amount was only a fraction of what had 
been awarded by the court. The ATA lawsuit was a failure in setting an example for deterring future 
human rights violations, failing to help promote robust democratic institutions in the Philippines, as 
evidenced by the subsequent rise of current President Rodrigo Duterte in 2016. 
Background of the Case   
 In examining this case, one must understand the nature of repression and the extent of human 
rights violations committed against Filipinos under Marcos. Any political opposition to Marcos from the 
left or from journalists made them primary targets (Chua, 2). Additionally, the impoverished who did not 
align politically with Marcos were targeted. (Chua, 2). The Marcos regime justified targeting these 
individuals by branding them as suspected communists. The estimated number of citizens who endured 
human rights violations at the hands of the regime, between the 1972 and1986, was staggering (Chua, 
2).  Chua explains that Amnesty International estimated during the Martial Law years that: 70,000 were 
imprisoned, 35,000 were tortured and 4,000 were killed (Chua, 2). When victims were detained and 
subjected to torture, it included, but was not limited to electric shock, “truth serum”, “Russian 
Roulette”, beating, pistol-whipping, water boarding and strangulation (Chua, 5). Women who were 
imprisoned and tortured were also subjected to sexual assault and rape (Chua, 7).  
It is crucial to understand how Ferdinand Marcos was able to commit these egregious human 
rights violations from 1972 to 1986 to understand the details of his eventual downfall. Under martial 
law, Marcos disbanded the legislative branch and dissolved the judiciary, replacing it with a military 
judiciary under his direct control (Davidson, 11). This created legal justification for Marcos’ actions and 
suspended due process (Davison, 11). Thus, Marcos was capable of committing these extensive human 
rights violations without any formal check on his authority.  
It is also important to discuss the role the United States, particularly under Reagan’s 
administration, in aiding Marcos throughout this time period (Davidson, 12). President Reagan was a 
staunch supporter of Ferdinand Marcos, even considering him to be a personal friend (Davidson, 12). 
The United States’ policy during this Cold War period was to give extensive support to any regime that 
claimed to be anti-Communist, much like Marcos’ (Davidson, 12). A major component of the U.S.-
Philippine alliance was extensive military aide, as well as a U.S. military presence including advisors and 
Central Intelligence Agency operatives who provided training to the Philippine military (Davison, 11). 
“Extensive U.S military aid enabled Marcos to expand the role of the military and its sphere of influence 
expanded into activities that were previously reserved to local police forces. Additionally, the court 
system—which was disbanded—was replaced with a military court system, creating a legal justification 
for forced detention without due process” (Davison, 11). Senator Paul Laxalt, a key Reagan supporter, 
was responsible for a significant investment in the Marcos military in 1985. According to the New York 
Times, “The Laxalt trip comes at a potentially critical moment for United States-Philippine relations. The 
Defense Department plans to invest about $1.3 billion in Clark Air Base and Subic Bay naval station in 
the Philippines despite warnings by United States intelligence agencies about increased Communist 
guerrilla activity there” (Weinraub, 1). 
 By lobbying, Marcos was able to retain significant support in Washington from the Reagan 
Administration and Congress, despite his well-known human rights violations. In 1985, Marcos retained 
the services of D.C lobbying firm of Black, Manafort and Stone. Paul Manafort, the principal lobbyist on 
behalf of Marcos at the time, is quoted saying, “We can facilitate understanding on both sides … I 
cannot speak for the Government here in Washington, but I am going to speak on behalf of the issues 
the Government cares about. I will be an advocate” (Manafort, 1). The extent of this lobbying 
relationship was detailed in an exposé on Paul Manafort published earlier this year in The Atlantic:  
“The firm’s international business accelerated when the Philippines became a client, in 1985. President 
Ferdinand Marcos desperately needed a patina of legitimacy: The 1983 assassination of the chief 
opposition leader, Benigno Aquino Jr., had imperiled U.S. congressional support for his regime. Marcos 
hired Manafort to lift his image; his wife, Imelda, personally delivered an initial payment of $60,000 to the 
firm while on a trip to the States” (Foer, 1).  
The article continued on to describe the 1986 election where, “the late pollster Warren Mitofsky 
traveled to the Philippines with CBS News to … conduct an exit poll for the election. When he returned, 
he told the political scientist Sam Popkin the story of how a representative of Manafort’s firm had asked 
him, ‘What sort of margin might make a Marcos victory legitimate?’ The implication was clear, Popkin 
told me: ‘How do we rig this thing and still satisfy the Americans?’” (Foer, 2018). 
Given the close relationship between Manafort’s firm and the Reagan administration, a gateway 
was provided that helped solidify an already blossoming relationship between Reagan and Marcos. Foer 
noted, “In the summer of 2016, Politico’s Kenneth Vogel, now with The New York Times, wrote a 
rigorous exegesis of a long-standing rumor: Manafort was said to have walked away with $10 million in 
cash from Ferdinand Marcos, money he promised he would deliver to Ronald Reagan’s reelection 
campaign (which would have been illegal). Vogel relied in part on the 1996 memoir of Ed Rollins, a 
Republican consultant” (Foer, 1). Furthermore, the relationship was so entangled that Ronald Reagan 
invited Marcos to the White House and made the following remarks: “President Marcos, we have 
accomplished a great deal together over the years. We will all do more in the years to come. Common 
determination to achieve a better life doesn’t mean that we need to be alike; we need only to treat one 
another in a spirit of generosity and mutual respect. If we do that, our continuing commitment to one 
another, resting as it does on many years of close areolation, will be solid now and for the future” 
(Regan, 1982). This alliance was critical in helping Marcos maintain control over the Philippines up until 
his downfall in 1986 (Davidson, 11).  
 Marcos’ downfall in February of 1986 started with a suggestion from then ally, President Ronald 
Reagan. Reagan advised Marcos to hold an election in order to further legitimize his rule (Davidson, 12). 
Heeding Reagan’s advice, Marcos held the election against his opponent, Corazon Aquino, a moderate 
liberal (Davidson, 12). Marcos went on to win the 1986 election with nearly 55% of the vote, but it was 
soon discovered that there were significant accounts of voter fraud (Davison, 13). This led to massive 
demonstrations and uprisings, led by opposing candidate, Corazon Aquino. The uprisings had such 
widespread support that they forced Marcos to step down and flee from the Philippines to Hawaii by 
the end of February (Davidson, 14). In response, several prominent U.S. politicians who were election 
observers pressured the Reagan Administration cut all ties to Marcos (Smith, 43). Hedrick Smith writes:  
“At the first reports of fraud by the Marcos side, some American observers discounted it as no worse than 
a Chicago election; Senator Richard Lugar was more critical…Lugar concluded that Aquino had surely won 
the election He felt the time had come to change the Philippine government and American Policy. Aids 
said he pressed that argument in a private session with President Reagan on February, 11. Reagan 
suggested that there had been fraud on both sides, but Lugar insisted that he had seen it only on the 
Marcos side…Lugar called on Reagan to telephone Marcos to ask him to resign, and his television 
appearances had impact…Reagan had been forced to shift. His position had been undermined both by 
televised scenes of massive fraud and by Lugar’s highly visible charges that the election was stolen and 
Marcos should go” (Smith, 43-44).  
Reagan’s main intermediary, Senator Laxalt, urged Marcos to step down. Eleanor Clift of the Los Angeles 
Times wrote, “Laxalt, recalling his conversation with Marcos for reporters on Tuesday, said he replied: 
‘Mr. President, I am not bound by diplomatic restraints. I am talking only for myself. I think you should 
cut and cut cleanly. I think the time has come’” (Clift, 1).  Reagan then suggested that Marcos step down 
and come to Hawaii (Davison, 14). After arriving in Hawaii, it became apparent that Marcos’ long-
standing relationship with Ronald Reagan had paid-off (Davison, 14). O’Leary writes, “Mr. Reagan had 
determined that offering asylum to Marcos and his group of about 90 associates and family members 
was in the best interests of U.S-Filipino relations. Mr. Marcos and his group were flown to Hickam Air 
Force Base, Hawaii on a U.S Military plane in the aftermath of a hotly contested Philippine election” 
(O’Leary, 1). 
 
 
Application of Transitional Justice Theories 
 After following Marcos’ removal from power in 1986, two main conditions shaped the 
Philippines’ decision to pursue justice against Marcos through the vehicle of the ATA. The first was U.S 
President Ronald Reagan’s decision to grant Marcos, and his close associates, asylum in Hawaii (O’Leary, 
1). Once Ronald Reagan granted Marcos asylum, it eliminated any chance of him being extradited back 
to the Philippines for potential prosecution (O’Leary, 1). The Aquino government would have requested 
his extradition, if possible, given Marcos’ notorious record of human rights violations and possession of 
ill-obtained wealth that he stole from the Filipino government (Davison, 16). With extradition ruled out 
as a viable course of action, the chance for a domestic criminal prosecution in the Philippines was 
essentially eliminated. Davison writes, “neither criminal nor civil proceedings were possible in the 
Philippines because the law there required that the defendant be physically present in the jurisdiction” 
(Davidson, 12). Therefore, the choices of justice mechanisms that could be deployed were severely 
limited (Davidson, 16).  
 The other condition that led the Philippines to pursue an ATA lawsuit came from a meeting that 
took place between Attorney Robert Swift and SELDA in the Philippines (Davidson, 18). After reading 
about Ferdinand Marcos being ousted from the Philippines and gaining asylum from the Reagan 
administration, Robert Swift, who had previously worked on unsuccessful attempts at ATA lawsuits, 
thought he saw an opportunity to bring an ATA suit against Marcos (Ela, 8). Swift then took it upon 
himself to travel to the Philippines, where he met with SELDA (Ela, 8). SELDA was comprised of elite 
members of society in the Philippines who considered themselves to be political opponents of Marcos: 
politicians, journalists and business leaders - many of whom had been jailed during Marcos’ rule (Ela, 8). 
SELDA’s goal was to pursue justice against Marcos, but their efforts had fallen flat after Marcos gained 
asylum in Hawaii (Ela, 8). “Before Swift’s arrival, anti-Marcos activists had not heard of the ATS or 
contemplated suing Marcos in a U.S. court. This changed when Swift met with the board members of 
SELDA, a social movement organization that advocated victims for and detainees during the Marcos 
regime” (Ela, 8). At first, SELDA had reservations about supporting Swift in his efforts to file an ATA claim 
against Marcos in the U.S., considering the NGO inclination that the United States was an imperialistic 
country. Using their court system would have been contrary to many of SELDA’s founding principles (Ela, 
8). However, SELDA ultimately decided to support and assist Swift in the pursuing the case as an ATA 
claim against Marcos appeared to be the only available option (Ela, 8).  
 SELDA proved to be instrumental in helping Swift fortify his case. SELDA’s use of networks on 
the ground in the Philippines helped to assemble 10,000 victims who would serve as the plaintiffs in the 
ATA lawsuit (Ela, 9). The goals that Swift and SELDA developed for the case were two-fold (Ela, 9). First 
was to make sure that as much information as possible would come out in court through victim 
testimony about the specifics of the human rights violations that Marcos had committed (Ela, 9). This 
would serve as an avenue to disseminate the truth to the entire world about the harsh realities of life 
under Marcos’ regime (Ela, 9). The second part of the goal was to gain as much compensation for the 
victims as possible for their suffering (Ela, 9). Swift and SELDA acknowledged that the second goal would 
be particularly difficult but necessary. In many cases, victims and their families had lost their incomes as 
a result of being physically disabled from torture or having the main income earner of a family 
disappeared or murdered at the hands of Marcos (Ela, 12).  
The context of this case within the broader field of transitional justice, particularly transitions 
from authoritarian regimes to democratic regimes is important to consider. Transitional justice scholars 
suggest that there be an important distinction made between a ruptured transition and a pacted 
transition (Pion-Berlin, 105). A ruptured transition is when an authoritarian regime is forced out by an 
incoming democratic regime (Pion-Berlin, 105). In these transitions, the outgoing authoritarian regime 
lacks negotiating power with the new regime and, as a result, often creates an opening for justice to 
take place, typically coming in the form of criminal prosecutions (Pion-Berlin, 106). There have been 
several cases where ruptured transitions have been followed by domestic criminal prosecutions, 
including cases in Argentina, Portugal, and Greece (Sikkink, 31).  
By contrast, a pacted transition is where the outgoing authoritarian regime voluntarily steps 
down from power and is then able to maintain a strong negotiating position with the incoming 
democratic regime (Pion-Berlin, 108). Through this negotiating position, the outgoing authoritarian 
dictator is typically able to carve out protections for himself by creating amnesty laws (Pion-Berlin, 109). 
In the case of pacted transitions, there is usually no opening for justice, and empirical evidence suggests 
that criminal prosecutions do not follow these transitions (Pion-Berlin, 109). Prominent examples of this 
include Spain after Franco and Chile after Augusto Pinochet (Olsen, 336).  
Another important part of transitional justice scholarship is the idea of Universal Jurisdiction and 
the Pinochet Precedent. Universal Jurisdiction is not codified within international law but has become a 
norm to some degree since 1998 with Pinochet’s arrest while visiting London (Sikkink, 4). A lawyer 
representing former victims of Pinochet, who were living in Spain at the time, petitioned a judge for 
Pinochet’s arrest. Under a portion of Spanish law, there is a provision for the prosecution of non-citizens 
accused of certain egregious crimes that have been committed outside of Spain (Sikkink, 4). The charges 
argued that Pinochet should be prosecuted for genocide, illegal detention, torture and that these acts 
fall outside the bounds of his official capacity as head of state and therefore are not protected by 
sovereign immunity (Sikkink, 5). After a lengthy appeals process, the United Kingdom high court ruled 
against Pinochet, declaring that these acts were outside the bounds of sovereign immunity and 
therefore, Pinochet could be prosecuted (Sikkink, 5).  
Although Pinochet died before an actual trial could take place, there were three important 
precedents established as a result of this process (Sikkink, 5). The first is that crimes under international 
law cannot be considered official state acts (Sikkink, 5). Second, former heads of state can be tried for 
crimes committed during their time as a head of state. Third, a sitting head of state can only be tried in 
an international tribunal. These three decisions came to be known as Universal Jurisdiction Laws. Some 
countries have since adopted their own Universal Jurisdiction laws, most notably in Belgium and other 
Western European countries (Sikkink, 5). The United States, however, does not have a universal 
jurisdiction law (Sikkink, 5).  
Marcos case is an outlier within the field of transitional justice. It does not fit the traditional 
outcome that would be expected following a ruptured transition. Marcos was forced to step down and 
flee, creating the rupture, but there was no criminal prosecution taken up against Marcos after the 
transition, which is a clear divergence from the trend of other ruptured transitions (Davidson, 11). The 
second way in which this case is unique is that after Marcos arrived in Hawaii, a world power (the United 
States) offered Marcos asylum. This prevented any chance of extradition from taking place, eliminating 
the possibility of a domestic criminal prosecution in the Philippines (Davidson, 11). Additionally, Macros’ 
case was not able to engage with the literature on Universal Jurisdiction for two reasons. First, 
consequential events of the Marcos case pre-dated the Pinochet arrest by over a decade and the 
precedents that came out of the arrest had not yet been adopted (Davidson, 11). Second, even if the 
Marcos case had been post-Pinochet’s arrest, the United States does not abide by Universal Jurisdiction 
laws. Therefore, a prosecution of Marcos by the means of Universal Jurisdiction would never have been 
a possibility (Sikkink, 4). 
 
  
Transitional Justice Mechanism Applications  
 The ATA is part of the civil procedure in United States federal law that was enacted in the 
Judiciary Act of 1789 (Kim, 389). The law states that the federal courts within the United States are the 
proper venue for a tort lawsuit that is brought about by a non-U.S. citizen against another non-U.S. 
citizen when both are physically present in the United States (ATA, LexisNexis). “The district courts shall 
have original justification of any civil action by an alien for a tort only committed in violation of the law 
of nations or a treaty of the United States (ATA, LexisNexis).  
Since its inception, the ATA largely remained dormant, with the exception of two cases prior to 
1980 (Kim, 390). The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FISA) often protected foreign officials from 
being sued in U.S Federal courts (Kim, 390). This changed in the case Filartiga v. Pena-Irala where two 
citizens from Paraguay brought a lawsuit against a former state official from Paraguay for torture and 
wrongful death (Kim, 390). The United States Court of Appeals in the Second Circuit ruled that since 
torture and wrongful death are considered to be violations of international law, the ATA could be 
applied to this particular situation (Kim, 391). The Court used the United Nations charter and General 
Assembly resolutions as the basis for their decision (Kim, 391). Kim writes, “Secondly, the court ruled 
that although all relevant acts occurred in Paraguay and all parties were Paraguayan citizens, U.S. 
Federal Courts still have jurisdiction under ATS. The Second Circuit justified jurisdiction over the matter 
by the theory of transitory torts” (Kim, 390). This was a landmark case that provided a new 
interpretation to the ATA that had previously been unused. Since the United States Supreme Court had 
not weighed in on the issue, the exact parameters had not yet been set for the exercise of the ATA in 
real cases (Kim, 391).  
This paved the way for Robert Swift to file the ATA lawsuit against Marcos on behalf of 10,000 
victims (Kim, 391). The case was given the title: Hilao v. Marcos and was filed in March 1986 (Kim, 391). 
At first, the Federal District Court in Hawaii dismissed the case. The judge ruled that Marcos’ actions 
were protected by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (Hilao v. Marcos). Swift then appealed the case 
to the Ninth circuit Court of Appeals. Hilao v. Marcos, reached the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals in 1992, 
and the court made several important rulings at the conclusion of the case (Hilao v. Marcos). First, the 
court ruled against the argument that the actions taken by Marcos were protected by the FISA, writing, 
“The Estate argues that Marcos’ acts were premised on his official authority, and thus fall within FISA. 
However, because the allegations of complaint are taken as true for purposes of determining where an 
action should be dismissed, Marcos’ actions should be treated as taken without official mandate 
pursuant to his own authority. Furthermore, we rejected the argument that Marcos’ actions were 
official or public acts” (Hilao v. Marcos). The Court then wrote, in reference to a Venezuelan dictator 
regarding FISA: “Even though characterized as a dictator, appellant was not himself the sovereign–
government – of Venezuela within the Act of state Doctrine. He was chief executive, public officer of the 
sovereign nation of Venezuela. It is only when officials having sovereign authority act in an official 
capacity that the Act of State Doctrine applies” (Hilao v. Marcos). Ultimately, the Court concluded that 
“Marcos’ acts of torture, execution, and disappearance were clearly (acting) outside his authority as 
President” (Hilao v. Marcos).  
After dismissing the FISA argument made by Marcos’ attorneys, the court sided with Swift and 
the plaintiff’s argument. While citing the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, the Court stated: “Under 
International law… the right to be free from official torture is fundamental and universal, a right 
deserving of the highest stature under international law a norm of just cogens. The Crack of the whip, 
the clamp of the thumb screw, the crush of the iron maiden and in these more efficient modern times, 
the shock of the electric cattle prod are forms of torture that the international order will not tolerate. To 
subject a person to such horrors is to commit one of the most egregious violations of the personal 
security and dignity of a human being” (Hilao. v. Marcos). The court then added, “The complaint alleges 
that Marcos under the color of law, ordered, orchestrated directed, sanctioned and tolerated the 
continuous and systematic violation of human rights of the plaintiffs and the class through the military, 
Para-military, and intelligence forces that he controlled; that at the direction of Marcos, plaintiffs and 
the 10,000 class members were arrested without cause, held incommunicado and routinely subjected to 
tactical interrogation, a euphemism for torture during interrogation that following tactical interrogation, 
many class members were arbitrarily detained for a year or more with Marcos’ authorization and 
approval” (Hilao v. Marcos). The court concluded its decision by stating, “On February 23, 1994, the jury 
awarded the plaintiffs 2.1 billion in exemplary damages” (Hilao v. Marcos).  
Evaluation of Transitional Justice Mechanism Implementation  
 There are two ways to evaluate the implementation of the ATA lawsuit Hilao v. Marcos. The first 
is to evaluate it based on the goals set by Swift and SELDA when the suit was launched. The primary goal 
was to use the court setting to give victims an opportunity to testify and publicly describe human rights 
violations that Marcos had committed for court record and the international community’s awareness of 
true situation (Ela, 8). This goal was clearly achieved, given that the court relied on that testimony when 
ruling that the Marcos was liable, under the ATA, to the victims. The court even included portions of 
testimony in the judicial opinion. Additionally, the case inspired a number of other ATA lawsuits over the 
next few decades following Hilao v. Marcos (Swift, 38). “The jury after completion of all phases of trial, 
returned an overall verdict for 9,539 class members for nearly $2 billion. The judgment was affirmed by 
the ninth circuit and is now a landmark in American and International human rights jurisprudence” 
(Swift, 38).  
The second goal was to obtain as much monetary compensation for the victims as possible (Ela, 
8). On this front, unfortunately Hilao v. Marcos was not as successful. Swift commented: “The recovery 
of $10 million of Marcos money in the United States after six years of protracted litigation was 
fortuitous and enabled the current distribution of $1,000 dollars to all eligible class members. The 
amount was not adequate compensation for the abuses committed, but it was a meaningful start” 
(Swift, 39). The total amount recovered two decades from when the case ended is only a fraction of the 
total amount that was awarded to victims in 1992. The ATA lawsuit lacked teeth and enforcement 
capabilities, which could potentially send signals to future perpetrators. 
Another way that Hilao v. Marcos ought to be evaluated is within the broader context of 
transitional justice, outside of the specific goals set by Swift and SELDA. The effectiveness of the case at 
bringing about subsequent democratic reform in the Philippines must be considered. Particular justice 
mechanisms are evaluated within the field of transitional justice is through deterrence: did the 
particular trial deter future heads of state or regimes in a given country from committing the same 
human rights violations that the subjects of the trial did? (Sikkink, 12) Additionally, did the trial shape 
the way in which the country, as a whole, felt about human rights and a particular leader or regime?  
Sikkink writes: “Here I refer to only one of the many meanings of justice: legal accountability for a crime. 
This is a common way to talk about justice in domestic judicial systems. What is new is to demand 
justice for previously immune state officials and to envision possibility of international prosecutions in 
addition to domestic prosecutions” (Sikkink, 12). Unfortunately, under this criterion, Hilao v. Marcos has 
come short. 
Conclusion  
Within the Philippines, liberal democracy still remains imperfect. There have been six 
democratically elected Filipino Presidents since the removal of Marcos, and the results have been a 
mixed-bag (Court, 1). In 1998, a dozen years after Marcos’ was ousted, Joseph Estrada was elected 
President only to be ousted by the military in 2001 for financial corruption (Court, 2). The removal was 
outside of the constitutionally established impeachment process, a red flag that the Philippine 
democratic institutions were not working properly (Court, 2). These concerns over democracy were only 
further exacerbated with the election of Rodrigo Duterte in 2016. Human Rights Watch recently wrote, 
“Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte’s murderous ‘drug war’ entered its second year in 2017 resulting 
in killing more than 1,200 drug suspects.” In the Human Rights Watch World Report 2018, they claim 
that, “Duterte has responded to increased criticism of his anti-drug campaign by impugning, harassing 
and threatening critics of the government and human rights defenders” (Human Rights Watch, 1).  
Currently, Freedom House gives the Philippines a “Partially-Free” rating. “Governing institutions 
are well developed in the Philippines, but the rule of law and application of justice are haphazard and 
heavily favor ruling elites. Violent insurgencies have continued for decades. Impunity remains the norm 
for crimes against activists and journalists. President Rodrigo Duterte’s war on drugs since 2016 has led 
to more than 12,000 extrajudicial killings as well as vigilante justice” (Freedom House, 2018). Given this 
backslide, the future for democracy in the Philippines looks rather grim. 
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